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Smartphones are increasingly augmented with sensors for a variety
of purposes. In this paper, we show how magnetic field emissions
can be used to fingerprint smartphones. Previous work on identifi-
cation rely on specific characteristics that vary with the settings
and components available on a device. This limits the number of de-
vices on which one approach is effective. By contrast, all electronic
devices emit a magnetic field which is accessible either through the
API or measured through an external device.
We conducted an in-the-wild study over four months and col-
lected mobile sensor data from 175 devices. In our experiments we
observed that the electromagnetic field measured by the magne-
tometer identifies devices with an accuracy of 98.9%. Furthermore,
we show that even if the sensor was removed from the device or
access to it was discontinued, identification would still be possi-
ble from a secondary device in close proximity to the target. Our
findings suggest that the magnetic field emitted by smartphones
is unique and fingerprinting devices based on this feature can be
performed without the knowledge or cooperation of users.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smartphones are equipped with a wide range of sensors that mea-
sure a variety of physical quantities including light, humidity, ori-
entation, acceleration, pressure, proximity, and location [9]. The
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information collected is used to enhance user experience (e.g., auto-
matic screen brightness adjustment and energy saving mode during
phone calls), to improve services (e.g., location-based services like
Uber and calendar reminders based on travel time), and also as a
commodity that benefits third parties (e.g., the use of microphones
in mobile devices to respond to ultrasonic beacons in order to mea-
sure the audience of an advertisement [36]). In many instances,
identifying a device or a user is trivial and expected (particularly
for services that require registration) but for unknown third parties
(i.e., secondary data collectors that gain access to the data without
users being explicitly aware of their activities) or for applications
where the user expects to remain anonymous (e.g., applications for
gaming, weather, and the news), many of these sensors potentially
expose the user’s private information [37].
The magnetometer is the sensor responsible for measuring the
magnetic field in the environment of the phone. It is commonly
available in all platforms and is usually combined in the same
chip with the sensors for linear acceleration and gyration. Apple,
with the release of the iPhone 3GS in 2009, added magnetometers
to the sensor array available on their devices [11]. The Android
operating system opened API support that same year with the
release of Cupcake (Version 1.5) [8]. The magnetometer provides a
newmeans to effectively fingerprintmobile devices in amanner that
is transparent to users. Accessing magnetometer readings requires
no permission declaration on either platform and the fact that
the magnetic field is radiated means that it can be measured from
outside the phone.
In this paper, we show that measurements of the magnetic field
can be used for identification. Every electronic device generates a
magnetic field. In smartphones, it varies depending on the compo-
nents active in the phone, the tolerance level of each component,
the degradation of the manufacturing materials on the phone, and
the topology of the underlying circuit. Each cell phone contains
hundreds of thousands of transistors alone and every component
in the phone is unique. Previous work shows that two seemingly
identical components have unavoidable differences that arise from
the manufacturing process [43]. This variability has been leveraged
for identification of sensors and other integrated circuits [18, 32].
We present two identification attacks that rely on magnetic fields: a
malware-based approach that can be carried out by any application
installed on a device that contains a magnetometer and a proximity-
based attack that can identify any device inside the range of the
external sensor measuring the magnetic field.
In the malware attack, the device on which the app is installed
is both the source and the instrument of collection of the magnetic
field. To demonstrate the feasibility of the attack, we released an
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app on the Play Store. Our final dataset comprises 175 devices with
a minimum of 10,000 readings per device. The application collects
readings from the magnetometer and transmits them back to our
servers for analysis. We use these readings to generate fingerprints
with which we identify devices. We show that selecting 1,000 ran-
domly spaced readings is sufficient to identify one device from a
group of 175 with an accuracy of 98.9%. To mitigate the risk to
users, we propose adding sensor readings to the permission plat-
form. While this would not directly affect the generation of the
fingerprint, it would at least serve as a warning system to users.
However, even after protecting the readings with the new per-
mission, bypassing this safeguard is still possible: we present a
second attack where the magnetic field readings are collected from
a device in close proximity to the target. Here, the requirements (i.e.,
the sensor and the software that collects the readings) have shifted
to the attacker and the victim has no possible means of detection.
The only countermeasure for this attack would be to increase the
shielding in the target device and reduce or, alternatively, eliminate
all electromagnetic emissions. However, we do not consider this as
a viable solution since it will render a device completely unusable.
This work is not the first in considering magnetic field emissions
in the context of privacy and security. Previous work shows that
electromagnetic leaks can be used to determine the instruction
being executed by a processor [20] and to extract data from a system
through the manipulation of memory access [27, 44] or through
write instructions to the hard drive [15]. However, this is the first
work to use magnetic fields as a way to achieve identification. There
are some practical difficulties related to device fingerprinting in
general. First, the fingerprinting accuracy attained with a specific
set of features is likely dependent on the total number of devices
present in the dataset. Second, the market diversity for mobile
devices with all the possible vendors, carriers, and designs makes
it difficult to find a single universal feature for identification. We
conduct a user study with 175 devices over a period of four months
using a feature common to all electronics.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We investigate and characterize the emission and collection
of magnetic fields from a large set of off-the-shelf mobile
devices, discussing how the fingerprint can be used for an
identification attack.
• We present two identification attacks based on magnetic
fields that enable adversaries to track devices remotely due to
the lack of permission protection from mobile platforms and
the properties inherent to electromagnetic fields. Moreover,
these fingerprints can be computed by anyone at any time
and they are as of now undetectable.
• We propose a methodology to process sensor readings and
through the use of two machine learning algorithms, k-
Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [22] and Random Forests (RF) [17].
We show that, by means of this approach, we are able to
achieve correct identification of the devices with up to 98.9%
accuracy in 1,000 readings.
• We discuss countermeasures for each attack and we outline
the open research directions in this area.
Figure 1: Measuring the Magnetic Field from a MEMS
device. The flow of current (I ) through a conductor
polarizes the material. The resulting voltage between
opposite sides is known as the Hall Voltage, from which
you can derive the magnetic induction B.
2 THE MAGNETOMETER SENSOR
The popularity and use of magnetic sensors have exploded in the
last decades and, while there are different technologies capable of
measuring magnetic fields, the most common distribution for mo-
bile devices is the Micro-ElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS) [19].
MEMS is the name given to batch fabrication techniques that al-
low for the combination of miniaturized (typically in the range
of micrometers to millimeters) mechanical and electrical systems
that generate a response in the macro scale. These silicon-based
systems are composed of mechanical structures, sensors, actuators,
and electronics all in the same chip [6].
Android classifies, the magnetometer as a position sensor [9]. In
most devices it is contained in a 9-axis MEMS chip where, along
with the accelerometer and the gyroscope, provides data over 3
axes [4]. MEMS magnetic sensors operate by measuring the po-
tential difference (i.e., voltage) across two sides of a conductive
material generated by a current flowing in the presence of a mag-
netic field. This phenomenon, called Hall Effect, is an established
method to measure the intensity of magnetic fields. Figure 1 pro-
vides a visualization of the operation of the sensor. In reality, the
measure is an approximation: while we are theoretically interested
in the value of the magnetic field (H ) measured in amperes per me-
ter (A/m), the sensor actually measures the magnetic induction (B)
measured in Tesla (T ). Equation 1 shows the relationship between
the magnetic field and the magnetic induction. The factor µ in the
equation corresponds to the magnetic permeability of the material.
While this value varies depending on the medium through which
the wave propagates, we assume that the medium is similar for all
mobile devices (i.e., plastic, air, and other electronics). We assume
that the value of µ is constant for all the readings and we use H as
a proxy of B [39].
B = µH (1)
The Android Sensor Stack controls the access to the magnetome-
ter [7]. It has seven levels of abstraction that go from the low-level
hardware component to the high-level software application. The
lower layers are implemented by the hardware manufacturers and
include drivers and library interfaces to the sensor. The higher lev-
els are determined by Google and are made available for developers
to use through the Application Programming Interface (API). The
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Table 1: Starting from the left, column one lists the two types of magnetic field events. The middle columns contain the size
and description of the response. Finally, the column on the far right contains the units corresponding to the values reported.
Sensor Call Response Description Units
TYPE_MAGNETIC_FIELD
SensorEvent.values[0] Geomagnetic field strength: x axis
µTSensorEvent.values[1] Geomagnetic field strength: y axis
SensorEvent.values[2] Geomagnetic field strength: z axis
TYPE_MAGNETIC_FIELD_UNCALIBRATED
SensorEvent.values[0] Geomagnetic field strength (without hard iron calibration): x axis
µT
SensorEvent.values[1] Geomagnetic field strength(without hard iron calibration): y axis
SensorEvent.values[2] Geomagnetic field strength(without hard iron calibration): z axis
SensorEvent.values[3] Iron bias estimation: x axis
SensorEvent.values[4] Iron bias estimation: y axis
SensorEvent.values[5] Iron bias estimation: z axis
API allows an application to register a sensor and it can be pro-
grammed to collect a response upon a value change event. Table
1 describes the data structure used by Android to represent the
readings of the magnetic field. The magnetometer has the ability
to output both the raw sensor readings and a measure calibrated
for internal interference. The calibrated reading is the combination
of the uncalibrated reading and some bias. This bias is the internal
magnetic field generated by the phone.
3 OVERVIEW OF THE ATTACKS
We consider an adversary who aims to establish the identity of
a device without directly requesting the Unique Device Identifier
(UID) provided by the platform. Android protects the UID through
the telephony permission, which is classified as a dangerous per-
mission, and the attacker may not want to alert the user as to their
intention [12]. The methodology we propose results in a strong
component of the identity (with an accuracy of over 90%) being
revealed to attackers without the consent of the user. We assume
that the adversary can either have an application installed on the
target device (malware attack) or get a secondary device in close
physical proximity to it (physical proximity attack). We anticipate
the physical proximity attack to be relevant in situations where
the phone is likely to remain static for any period of time. This
might include wireless charging stations, coffee shops, or work-
place environments where an employer could potentially track the
movement of employees from the identification and localization of
their phones.
3.1 Malware Attack: Identification Through
the Analysis of the Bias
We first consider a malware attack where the primary goal of the
adversary is to maximize the number of devices to fingerprint. The
underlying requirements are that each phone has both a magne-
tometer and an app that collects the readings and transmits them
back to the attacker. The app gets installed on the phone through
usual means: social engineering or drive-by downloads.
The magnetic induction (B) reported by the OS is measured in
the 3D coordinate plane. The Hardware Abstraction Layer interface
Figure 2: The environmental magnetic readings of one
device capture the emissions of proximate devices.
(HAL) provided by Android gives developers six values correspond-
ing to the raw sensor readings and the device’s internal bias each
reported in three dimensions.
In this first attack we use the magnetic field emitted by the phone
(i.e., the bias) as the input feature to the classifier. Section 5 provides
an in-depth analysis of the attack, including a description of our
use of each of the fields in Table 1.
3.2 Physical Proximity Attack: Identification
Through External Readings
The first attack is an internal software-based attack. The sensor,
while present in the device, is not being used to assess the environ-
ment in which it operates but rather to report a value that comes
as the outcome of a calibration equation. In other words, there
is no evaluation of external phenomena, but only of the intrinsic
characteristics of the MEMS-based sensor. Instead, in the second
attack, the sensor is used to measure the radiation coming from
the device to be identified, i.e., it is therefore an external attack.
Figure 2 presents the second attack scenario. We have two devices:
a target or victim and an adversary or attacker. The requirement is
that the attacker has a magnetometer and the software with which
to collect and process the readings.
The challenge is to extract a set of characteristics that describes
the behavior of the signal emitted by the targeted device from the
environmental signal collected by the attacker. The deployment of
the second attack is described in Section 6 and the features selected
for identification are discussed in detail in Section 6.2.
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4 DESCRIPTION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
MODEL
To show the feasibility of the method we propose, we follow three
steps: data collection; feature definition and analysis; and, identifi-
cation. Each step will be discussed in detail throughout the paper.
To carry out identification, we use supervised classification al-
gorithms. We are interested in two pieces of information: a unique
identifier for each device which will be used as ground truth (i.e.,
the label of each observation) and the measure of the magnetic field
emitted by each device (i.e., the separable features).
For each device di in our dataset D of size |D| = M
D = {d1,d2, . . . ,di , . . . ,dM },
we have a set of L independent readings
Rdi = {rdi1 , r
di
2 , . . . , r
di




with i being the unique identifier of each device and, therefore, the
label assigned to the appropriate reading during classification. Each
reading rdij for device di is composed of N features on which the
classifier is built.




j ), . . . , fk (R
di
j ), . . . , fN (R
di
j )}.
The model trained on F(Rdij ) is then evaluated on unseen unlabeled
observations. We use dunk to denote a reading taken from an un-
known device. This will be the case for all the testing observations.
The outcome of each test R
dunk
j is a conditional probability dis-
tribution given by Pr (di |F(R
dunk
j )) for each device di in D. Finally,




d̂ = arдmaxdi Pr (dunk = di |F(R
dunk
j )).
If the predicted device d̂ matches the ground truth (i.e., the true label
of the reading), which we have for the testing set, we consider the
test a success and classify it a hit. If, alternatively, the observation
is misclassified, then it becomes a miss.
To summarize, we can formulate our research question as follows:
given a set of devices, are the differences in the characteristics of the
radiated emissions between each device sufficient to uniquely identify
each one of them?
5 MALWARE ATTACK: IDENTIFICATION
THROUGH THE BIAS READINGS
The first set of results we present are with respect to the malware
attack, i.e., an attacker that wishes to remotely identify devices
such as phones and tablets. The main challenge in remotely iden-
tifying devices is finding a weakness that can be accessed across
all models and all manufacturers. Like for previous studies, the
success of the malware attack depends on the device having the
appropriate hardware. Given the popularity and widespread use of
the magnetometer, we accept this as a reasonable assumption. To
collect sensor information, an attacker only requires access to the
API. The most natural way for data to be collected and transmitted
is through an application. In order to use it they would need to
request network access permission to send information. Alterna-
tively, as it was shown in [16], the attacker might gain access to
the readings through a browser application and generate a signa-
ture that way. In this work, we develop an application to access
TYPE_MAGNETIC_FIELD_UNCALIBRATED and collect the 3D
readings from the phone’s magnetometer. From the six readings
we obtain from each sensor event (see Table 1), we focus on those
that correspond to the internal bias of the phone. The values for
the bias are constant for a session and we will show that only a few
measurements are sufficient to generate a robust signature. More-
over, once generated, we observed that the signature is stable over
time and therefore the frequency with which the sensor must be
sampled to maintain accuracy is less than once every two months.
One implication of this attack is the ability of service providers
(and other interested parties) to track users across multiple de-
vices by linking and distinguishing different devices through log-in
events; alternatively, it can be used to recognize the same device
when the application has been removed then reinstalled, or to link
multiple accounts that connect from the same device.
5.1 Ethics
While we are only identifying devices, the typically exclusive re-
lationship between owner and device (as well as their proximity)
implies we are indirectly identifying users. In addition to sensor
readings, we collected basic demographic information as well as
unique device identifiers that could be traced back to individuals.
For these reasons, we submitted this project to our institution’s
review board and received ethical approval for this work.
Each participant had access to an overview of the project as well
as details on the type of data that would be collected throughout the
study. Additionally, the information sheet and the informed consent
form are available on the project’s website as well as withdrawal
procedures and a contact email in case of any follow-up questions.
5.2 General Characteristics of the Dataset
To carry out the attack, we developed the app My Magnetic Field,
distributed through the Google Play Store. In exchange for their
participation, users were able to see (i) the value of the sensor; (ii)
an electronic compass; and (iii) a heat map showing the intensity
of the magnetic field at the locations of the data points.
The app was installed by 315 users in 15 countries. We identified
41 manufacturers with 61% of all devices belonging to the top 5
most popular brands (i.e., Samsung, Xiaomi, Huawei, Motorola, and
Lenovo) and a total of 187 distinct models. The magnetometers can
all be traced back to 14 vendors, the most popular being Yamaha
Corporation. We also found that the same phone manufacturer may
have more than one company supplying their sensors.
From the dataset, we discarded all devices for which we had
less than 33 minutes 20 seconds of data (the equivalent of 10,000
readings) and all those users that installed the application on phones
that did not have a magnetometer. We also deleted entries for which
the magnetic field readings were all reported as 0µT . The final
dataset contains readings from 175 devices.
5.3 Classification Task
Figure 3 provides a high-level view of the distribution of the mag-
nitude of the magnetic field for 30 sample devices. We observe
that the classes are not easily separable: the values are clustered






















































Magnitude Magnetic Field per User
Figure 3: Magnitude of the bias for a subset of users.
s classifier precision accuracy
10,000
KNN 0.995 (±0.019) 0.995 (±0.0001)
RF 0.995 (±0.016) 0.995 (±0.0001)
1,000
KNN 0.989 (±0.002) 0.989 (±0.0004)
RF 0.988 (±0.002) 0.988 (±0.0003)
100
KNN 0.964 (±0.0005) 0.964 (±0.001)
RF 0.957 (±0.0004) 0.957 (±0.002)
10
KNN 0.888 (±0.0001) 0.871 (±0.011)
RF 0.869 (±0.0001) 0.840 (±0.015)
Table 2: Precision and Accuracy for the classification of 175
devices. In the table, s denotes the number of readings or
samples included in the training set.
together, often overlapping. The behavior displayed suggests that,
while the emissions of each device are not random, boundary-based
algorithms are not likely to be effective.We chose Random Forests
(RF) [17] and k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [22] for the classification
task. We chose RF for its robust behavior in the presence of noise
and KNN for its distance-based selection of the predicted class.
In this paper, we use the term model to refer to the evalua-
tion of an algorithm with specific training data (i.e., a classifier
with a defined dataset). The values of the parameters required for
each algorithm were chosen as a combination of best practices and
empirical results through the use of the grid search algorithm in
scikit-learn [38]. KNN requires two parameters to be set: the num-
ber of neighboring points to be considered in the class assignment
of the unlabeled data (i.e., the value of k) and the definition of the
distance metric that links any two points. In our KNN models, we
use Euclidean distance as the metric between two points as recom-
mended in [42] and k = 1 as the optimal value reported by the grid
search.
5.4 Feature Generation
The sensor stack introduced in Section 2 provides access to the
different sensors (and their corresponding data streams) available
in the device. There are two possible values that may be used to
access magnetometer readings: TYPE_MAGNETIC_FIELD and
TYPE_MAGNETIC_FIELD_UNCALIBRATED. Equation 2 shows
the relationship between observations collected using each of these
values. In the equation below, each element is a vector that contains
features in three axes: x, y, and z. RunC contains the raw readings
collected from the uncalibrated variable and RC corresponds to
radiation readings external to the phone. The values for RI B repre-
sent the internal bias of the phone, in other words, the magnetic
field emitted by the device that is expected to interfere with the
environmental measure.
RunC = RC + RI B (2)
The physical interpretation of Equation 2 confirms the feasibility
of the attack: each device does, in fact, generate a field that is
calculated at run-time which interferes with the environmental
reading. Essentially, the specification states that the raw sensor
readings from TYPE_MAGNETIC_FIELD_UNCALIBRATED are
the environmental magnetic field as well as the noise introduced
by the device itself (i.e., the internal magnetic field of each phone),
which they refer to as bias.
The correction formula for each sensor is provided by the device
manufacturer. However, we know from the SDK that the bias cor-
rection takes into account three factors: the internal temperature
of the phone, the internal interference generated by electrical com-
ponents in the device (i.e., hard-iron calibration), and the internal
interference created by any shielding materials contained in the
device (i.e., soft-iron calibration) [8]. In a tri-axial MEMS magnetic
sensor, the corrections, like the measurements, are reported in three
dimensions. Table 1 contains the API’s description of the values
returned by the sensor and the difference between the calibrated
and uncalibrated readings.
In all the experiments presented in this section, we use the values
of the bias reported in three axes, x, y, and z with respect to each
device, as the input features for each of the classifiers. We treat
measurements as independent data points (i.e., we do not consider
in our analysis the temporal relationship between consecutive mea-
surements). As we will show in the following sections, given the
high accuracy of the attack, there was no need for more complex
manipulation of the input data. Rather than being detrimental to
the proposed idea, its simplicity showcases the effectiveness of the
method for identification.
5.5 Results
The magnetic field radiated by each device generates a unique sig-
nature that can be accessed through the sensor stack by the bias
values reported in TYPE_MAGNETIC_FIELD_UNCALIBRATED.
In Table 2, the values presented are an aggregation over 60 runs
of each model. The left-most column (s) contains the number of
measurements per device used to train each model. Figure 4 shows
the influence of the number of observations included in the training
set for each device. For completeness, we also ran the experiments
following a 10-fold cross-validation scheme for each model and
found the results to have no significant difference to the ones pre-
sented using aggregated randomized sampling. Combined, these
results show that the accuracy does not reflect models that are
overfitted but rather a true identifier latent in the data.
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Figure 4: Impact in classification from the number of
observations per device for 175 devices.
In terms of the success of the attack, Table 2 shows that for the
same number of users, higher accuracy requires an increase in the
number of observations per user. In Section 5.2 we discussed that all
valid users have at least 10,000 observations. As mentioned above,
each experiment was conducted 60 times and the results are an
average over all the runs. For each user (in every iteration), all
observations (ordered by time) are split into a 70/30 proportion for
training and testing data respectively. The observations used in the
algorithm are chosen randomly from all data points collected for
each user.
5.5.1 Battery Consumption: The Influence of Voltage on Electro-
magnetic Emissions. Given the results presented in Table 2, one
legitimate concern might be that, when measuring the internal
magnetic field, the state of the battery is driving the measurement.
In other words, the battery status might heavily influence the identi-
fication results, making them unreliable. To rule this possibility out,
we now look at the influence of battery discharge on the magnetic
emission of the device.
As discussed in Section 2, the magnetic field emitted by the
phone is a byproduct of the current flowing through a device at
any given time. However, measuring the current is not trivial and
prone to error. To test the effect of battery discharge, we performed
a controlled experiment on 10 phones where we measured both
the battery levels and the radiation emitted by the phone. All of
the measurements were collected at the same location and simi-
lar circumstances. Each device was set to stream an 8-hour video
with the screen brightness and volume at maximum settings. Each
experiment took on average 5 hours.
Figures 5a and 5b show an example of the typical behavior ob-
served. In Figure 5a the magnetic field is presented as a function
of the battery percentage. Comparing these readings to those pre-
sented in Section 6.1, we can see that battery depletion serves as a
proxy for time and, as evidenced by the trendlines shown in red,
the two variables are nearly independent. In contrast, Figure 5b
shows that the voltage and the battery depletion have a very strong
correlation with a coefficient of approximately 0.9994. The physical
explanation for this is that, as the battery of the phone is used, the
voltage in the battery falls. Once the voltage is not sufficient to
sustain the current that is required for the operation of the device,
the phone shuts down with the battery depleted. The relationship
between voltage, current and resistance is given by Ohm’s Law as
V = IR where V is the voltage, I is the current, and R the resistance.
Both the empirical evidence and the physical explanation attest to
the fact that in using magnetic field readings, we are not identifying
the battery level of the phone.
5.5.2 Unique-in-a-line: Differentiating Between Devices in Semi-
Controlled Environments. The dataset described in Section 5.2 con-
tains readings from devices of the same brand and indeed the same
model. However, given that we do not achieve perfect classification,
it is important to understand whether the values provided by the
API are the same for all devices of the same model or whether they
are unique to a device. Moreover, from Section 5.5.1 we learned
that the magnetic field depends also on the resources in use, and
therefore, it would be equally as important to determine whether
we can distinguish between devices executing the same task.
To test both these scenarios we created a second application that
triggers a predefined sequence of tasks over the span of 45 seconds.
This sequence includes playing a video from the phone’s internal
memory, a controlled-step increase and decrease of the screen’s
brightness, and the calculation of two Fibonacci numbers. Our
aim was to standardize the behavior of the phone when collecting
measurements. We tested this on four Nexus6 devices purchased
at the same time, running the application simultaneously, at the
same location. We ran the application 10 times on each phone and
computed a leave-one-session-out cross validation scheme where
we train on nine iterations and test on the remaining one (for each
phone). We repeat this 10 times, leaving a different session out each
time, then aggregate the results.
In this experiment we achieved perfect classification. Every test
value was assigned to the correct device in every iteration. The
magnetic field emitted by a phone is not hard-coded into all devices
of the same model and while it varies with the level of activity of a
phone, different devices exhibit different values.
5.5.3 Impact of Geography: Understanding the Spatial Sensitivity
of the Measurements. Another external factor that may influence
results is the location of the device at the time of the measurement.
In attempting to identify each device, we may be inadvertently
fixating on its environment. One form of environmental noise is the
presence of significant sources of radiation (e.g., transmission lines,
electric substations, thunder storms, etc.) close to the measurement
device [5, 34].
Magnetic fields that result from natural events are in the range
of micro(µ) and milli(m) Tesla (T). For human-generated emissions,
the World Health Organization suggests a maximum dose of 2 T
with a recommended occupational exposure of no more than 200
mT [1]. Each country has its own regulations but, as the values
we find are in the range of µT , both natural and man-made events
have the potential of affecting our results. We define geographic
independence as the ability to correctly classify a device using
readings from a previously unobserved location.
To test for geographic independence we used the application
described in Section 5.5.2 and collected readings at 10 different
locations in London. Locations include public transport (buses and
subways), coffee shops, university laboratories, restaurants, stores,
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(a) Magnetic field as a function of battery consumption for a
Motorola Nexus 6.
(b) Voltage as a function of battery consumption for a Motorola
Nexus 6.
Figure 5: Influence of battery state on the generated magnetic field
Figure 6: Confusion matrix for the identification of each
phone at different locations through the city.
residential buildings, etc. We aggregate these results in a leave-a-
place-out cross validation scheme where we used 9 locations in the
training set and the remaining location for testing. This is repeated
until every location has been used for testing. With an accuracy
of 96%, the results in Figure 6 show that the internal bias of the
phones is not determined by its environment.
5.5.4 Robustness Over Time: Exploring the Stability of the Output
Values. Finally, we provide results to support the claim for the
robustness of the method over time. We investigate the temporal
validity of the signature of a device, i.e., the time interval during
which the model can be used for the classification task after its
initial training.
Using the application described in Section 5.5.2 we present mea-
surements from a single device at intervals of 12 hours over a period
of 77 days. The boxplots shown in Figure 7 show that while the
values are not identical, the variance within each axis is low. With
these results we are confident that the signature of a device will
remain constant over the period of at least two months.
Figure 7: Distribution of the values of the bias for each axis.
5.6 Limitations and Countermeasures
The primary limitation of this attack is that the bias can only be
accessed from within each device. As there are no permissions for
themagnetometer, any (malicious) app can access sensor readings to
generate a fingerprint. Removing the magnetometer from devices is
not a viable solution. One alternative is having the sensor available
but under the responsibility of the user, is a good compromise and it
is in agreement with the precedent set by the different platforms [2,
3, 24].
In the next section we will discuss how, by placing a secondary
device (i.e., an external measurement instrument) within range of
the target, identification remains feasible even when internal access
to the sensor is not possible.
6 PHYSICAL PROXIMITY ATTACK:
IDENTIFYING ONE DEVICE FROM
ANOTHER
Successful attacks are contingent on access to the target system. In
many cases, network connectivity is enough to gain access, execute
the exploit, and retrieve the response. It also allows for an increase
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in the number of potential targets and offers some measure of pro-
tection for the attacker. However, the lack of physical presence also
translates into diminished control. The results presented in Section
5.5 place the hardware and software constraints on the targets and
require users to install an application (or another form of malware)
on a phone that has the appropriate sensor. Once the application
is running successfully, an attacker can collect information and
identify devices simultaneously. However, the novelty of our attack
is not that we identify devices through sensor readings (as if to
imply that the sensors are the source of the signature) instead, what
we propose is that each device emits magnetic radiation that can
be collected by a magnetometer and used to generate a unique
signature. In this second attack, we shift hardware and software
requirements to the attacker and accept physical proximity as the
limiting constraint. The implication is that now any electronic de-
vice is identifiable; all that is necessary is for the attacker to provide
a magnetometer-enabled device with the corresponding software
to conduct the attack. In this section we present the identification
results for the attack illustrated in Figure 2.
6.1 Experiment Setup and Data Collection
In this scenario we have an adversary (dA) who collects readings
from a victim (dV ), the target of the identification attack. This sec-
ond dataset was all collected in the same location over a period of
two weeks from a group of voluntary participants selected through
convenience sampling. Each participant interacted with their own
device and the collection device was the same for all measurements.
The parameters of the collection were more restrictive than those
in the first attack, for instance, for the duration of the collection,
participants were (mostly) stationary and their devices were con-
tinuously in use. Each participant was briefed at the beginning of
the session with the procedure and objectives. The participants
were told that the content of their data was not the object of the
study, only the emissions of their device. They were each told that
the distance between the two devices should never exceed a palm
width (approximately 20 cm) and that dA should remain immobile
in a flat surface (i.e., resting on a table). After giving each of them
some time to answer questions, they received no further input
from the researcher. In practical terms, this means that there is
a fair expectation of noise in the collected readings. The partici-
pants had no restrictions on the applications being used. They were
told that they should maintain continuous interaction (i.e., their
task was to use their phone without allowing it to enter standby
mode). Participants responded in different ways, some watched
videos, others listened to music, responded to emails, used chat
applications, played games, read e-books, etc. We assume that the
data collected reflects the range of resource consumption and be-
havior that would be normally associated with each device. All
measurements were completed with the same instance of dA and
the settings of the device were adjusted to the highest resolution
available (i.e., a sampling rate of 10 Hz).
Each of the participants used their device continuously providing
us data for a period of 30 min. Overall we collected data from
30 participants that resulted in 4 different mobile platforms (i.e.,
Android, Apple, Blackberry, Windows), 7 brands, and 22 distinct
models.
6.2 Feature Generation
We have already shown that the internal magnetic field can be
used for identification. The next task is to determine whether the
unique internal field identified in Section 5 can be extracted from
the environmental magnetic field collected from a secondary device.
Different from the analysis conducted in Section 5.5 the measure-
ments collected by dA do not consist solely of the magnetic field
of dV . Instead, the values represent the magnetic field around dA,
which includes the emissions of dV . A second major difference is
that while in Section 5.5 the magnetic field was measured in three
orthogonal axes of fixed position and orientation with respect to
the device. When we look at the environmental magnetic field, the
frame of reference is variable and the axes with respect to the Earth
are constantly changing. Hence, for a valid comparison, we trans-
form the three-dimensional readings into a single value through
the magnitude (norm) of the readings.
Extracting a specific signature from the environmental magnetic
field is a challenging problem. Any environmental reading will
contain at least one source of white noise, our planet’s naturally
occurringmagnetic field. If themeasurement is recorded in an urban
setting, then additional sources of noise are any ferromagnetic
materials in the vicinity of the device [21]. This noise is variable
and in the order of µT , well within our range of interest. However,
given the pervasiveness of the noise any identification attack must,
in order to be successful, overcome these challenges and find the
signature of a device.
Figures 8a, 8b, 8c, and 8d show the signal collected from four
instances of dV . Each graph corresponds to a different device, the
first two represent the same model (an iPhone SE), and the last two
are both Samsung devices, one low-range (Galaxy Core Prime) and
the other comparatively high-range (Galaxy S5). As evidenced by
the figure, for the second dataset, in addition to Android we col-
lected measurements from Apple, Blackberry and Microsoft devices
and the results we present include them as well. We would also like
to underline another difference: whereas in the previous attack we
consider each reading as a discrete signal, now we interpret these
observations as time series. Indeed, in the malware attack, we had
direct access to the phone’s magnetic field. This is no longer the
case. Now, we must extract the phone’s field from the environmen-
tal measurements and in order to achieve this we include in our
analysis the relationship between adjacent observations.
We extract features in the temporal and frequency domain and
following the recommendation in [33], we rank the features accord-
ing to the accuracy exhibited in each classifier and build the models
in accordance with the rank. Each signal is divided in two: the first
20 minutes are used for training and the remaining 10 for testing.
6.3 Results
The signal of interest is the magnitude of the magnetic field as
measured in the environment of dA. For each device we considered
a signal sampled at 10 Hz comprised of 18,000 measurements (i.e.,
10 measures per second for 30 minutes). For each device, we sam-
pled the signal for different time-spans and computed the features
described in Section 6.2.
Figure 9 summarizes themain results. From all the features tested,
using the signal’s minimum, maximum, and median values and a
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Figure 9: Classification F-Score for increasing duration of
training signal.
training signal duration of 16.7min we achieve 99.9% accuracy with
RF and 99.0% with KNN. Overall, the attack is viable and results in
accurate identification. If however, we reduce the period for data
collection, we observe that training time is approximately halved
to 8.3min and, at the same time, we are still able to achieve 99.4%
for RF and 96.7% for KNN. It is worth underlining that the random
baseline for classification is around 3% for both methods.
6.4 Limitations and Countermeasures
The primary limitation of this attack is the proximity required
between dA and dV . This limits the number of devices that can
be identified at any time and it puts physical demands on the at-
tacker that are simply not there in the malware attack. For these
experiments we were using Hall Effect Sensors to measure magnetic
field. A more sensitive sensor, for instance a fluxgate magnetometer,
would undoubtedly increase the spatial range of the measurements.
However, the resources available for this project did not allow us
to empirically test the range of the fluxgate sensor.
With respect to potential countermeasures, legislation already
regulates the emissions from a device to prevent, among other
things, interference across devices. Manufacturers already incorpo-
rate shielding into their electronics’ designs.
While the magnetic field is a single physical (vectorial) quantity
measured by one sensor, it is actually the result of an intricate
interaction of components, material degradation, and user behavior
just to name a few. An effective countermeasure for this attack
would be a cover that offers full shielding for the device. This
level of shielding however would make the (communication) device
unusable: along with the magnetic field, the shielding would filter
the network signal and wireless network capabilities.
7 RELATEDWORK
Previous work on device fingerprinting can be grouped into two
main areas: identification through content and identification through
physical characteristics of a device.
7.1 Content-Based Identification
Given the personal nature of devices, we expect the user-specific
content of a phone (e.g., photos, applications, contacts, music) to
be significantly different to most if not all others. In [40] Quattrone
et al. present an interesting approach combining both content (i.e.,
system settings, language settings, etc.) and physical descriptions
(i.e., internal and external memory size, device manufacturer and
model) to generate their signature. Using similar types of auxiliary
information in [31] and [45] the authors expose a series of informa-
tion leaks from the operation of the device. One reveals the identity
of the user through the monitoring of network data usage statistics
of some key applications; the other, the identity of the device from
the most recent songs played. One shortcoming of their approach is
that, while fingerprinting is possible (and accurate), it is also based
on user behavior, which changes over time.
Other studies focus on the identification of devices using lists of
applications installed on the phones. Both [10] and [26] find that
the list of applications installed is highly discriminative in terms
of devices and that even if, instead of app names, the classification
was based on the app categories, it would still reveal some partial
information about the user.
Finally, in [29] the authors combine a set of descriptors from the
browser, system, and hardware attributes as well as some behav-
ioral characteristics of the user. The paper is originally intended
to corroborate the standardized settings of web-browser. The au-
thors also find that combining different attributes fingerprinting
is still possible. In contrast, as we showed in Section 5, our work
only looks at user behavior indirectly (as it reflects the resource
consumption of the phone) and never at content.
7.2 Hardware-Based Identification
This concept of manufacturing variability has been presented before
in its application as a means for identification and authentication.
From a theoretical point of view, in [43] the authors present the
properties and applications of silicon-based physically unclonable
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functions (PUFs). These rules are then used in [32] where the au-
thors present a system that utilizes the timing delays of transistors
and wires in individual circuit boards to compute private crypto-
graphic keys using PUFs. In [18] the silicon-based imperfections of
network interface cards are used to identify devices through the
passive analysis of the radio signals they transmit.
The array of sensors available in mobile devices gives an im-
portant added perspective. It not only allows the exploitation of
internal differences for identification, but it also adds a dimension in
the form of environmental interactions. In [16] they present two ap-
proaches for identification. The authors show that combiningmicro-
phone and speaker systems and computing the distortion of a con-
trol signal results in accurate classification of the device; however,
for this approach they need to request two permissions, namely
RECORD_AUDIO and MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS. In the same
paper, they introduce a second attack: identification through the
calibration error of the accelerometer. Similar to our work, they
require no permissions to collect readings from the sensor. They
create a web application and ask participants to leave their devices
stationary and facing up while the data collection takes place. The
authors find that it is possible to identify all devices with an ac-
curacy of 58.7%. To this respect, our results correspond to those
presented in this paper, imperfections introduced in the manufac-
turing process make each device unique; moreover, this uniqueness
can be quantified and used for identification. However, there are
several notable differences with respect to our work. They rely on
all users performing the same task and they propose twomethods to
reduce the usefulness of their attack: the calibration of each sensor
at production time to eliminate the variability in the readings and
the introduction of some random value to prevent the recognition
of a baseline state in the device. These proposals do not invalidate
our work. On one hand, the magnetometer has a dynamic internal
calibration that is applied to each reading to compensate for the
iron bias in the device and on the other, there already are sources of
noise in the readings. The first attack presented (i.e., the malware at-
tack) uses the magnetic field generated by each device (as reported
by the sensor’s calibration) to identify each phone. In the second
attack (i.e., the proximity attack) we collect the signal emitted by
the device as well as all the environmental noise and run successful
identification tests on them.
Other projects have also looked at identification from sensor im-
perfections and biases. In [25] the authors present results using the
manufacturing imperfections in the accelerometer for identification.
Similarly, in [13] the authors use the imperfections found in the
magnetometer to identify devices. These two papers rely on iden-
tifying one state in the device and finding the difference between
the known state and the measurement to compute the influence of
the imperfection thereby identifying each phone. Kohno et al. show
that remote identification is possible without permissions or modi-
fications to the target device. They rely on clock skews to generate
fingerprints but, in their approach, there needs to be an established
connection between attacker and target [30]. This requires some
access to the target device which might not be feasible. Similarly,
physical imperfections have been used to generate fingerprints for
other types of devices as is the case for radio transceivers [23],
computers (through their USB ports) [14], and wireless devices in
a network [28, 41] though in general their use and application is
different from the ones proposed.
The body of work presented in this subsection is closer to our
approach to identification in that it is based on the analysis of a
physical quantity. Similar to the work on accelerometers and audio
systems we show that unique physical features in devices exist
and can be measured. However, in contrast with the identification
work on accelerometer, electromagnetic radiation can be accessed
externally and cannot be hidden. In [25] the authors show that
adding noise to the data is an effective countermeasure to their
identification scheme. In our work, (magnetic field) noise is already
part of the signal. Presented differently, most papers that use man-
ufacturing imperfections aim to measure the imperfection, whilst
in our work, we assume the imperfection is there and measure a
quantity that is necessary for the operation of the device and which
is influenced by the imperfection itself. In this sense, the method we
propose is more robust than any of those presented in the literature.
7.3 Side Channel Attack: Using Magnetic Fields
to Extract Information
Finally, magnetic fields have been exploited for side channel at-
tacks [15, 20, 27, 44]. Most recently, in [35] the authors record
magnetic leaks to capture the data being written to a laptop’s hard
drive. Most of the proposed attacks require dedicated software on
the target and the mobile device is used only as a measurement
instrument. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
leverage electromagnetic radiation for the purpose of identification.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a method for identifying phones from the mag-
netic field they emit.We considered two types of attack, one internal,
based on the magnetic field reported by the Android API, and one
external, based on readings collected from a secondary device.
With respect to the internal attack, we have discussed the clas-
sification results using two supervised learning algorithms, KNN
and RF, over two different datasets and we have shown that we are
able to identify one device in a group of 175 and approximately 1.6
minutes of data with a precision of 98.9% This holds an advantage
of approximately 165 times over the precision exhibited by the
random classification baseline where the probability of success is
around 0.6%. Even if this internal attack is limited to those devices
that have a magnetometer and which have the data collection ap-
plication installed, the lack of permissions associated to collecting
readings from the sensor makes this attack invisible to users.
As far as the external (proximity) attack is concerned, we have
shown that from a distance of approximately 20 cm a Hall Effect
sensor is sufficient to collect the signal from the victim and generate
the fingerprint. Using three features in the temporal domain, we
have achieved a maximum accuracy of 99.9% by using a 16 minute
signal for training.
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